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JOHN PAUL II ON THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN CIVIL LAW AND THE MORAL LAW:
UNDERSTANDING EVANGELIUM VITAE IN LIGHT OF
THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY AND THE
MORAL GRAMMAR OF JOHN PAUL H
GREGORY

R.

BEABOUT* AND MARY CATHERINE HODES**

To what extent should civil law reflect the moral law? What
is the appropriate role of religion in a democracy with regard to
influencing civil law? In particular, to what extent should Roman
Catholic leaders, especially the Pope and the bishops, seek to
influence public policy?
These questions have recently gained peculiar prominence
in the political discourse of the United States and in other parts
of the world. In the United States, the proliferation of reproductive and therapeutic technologies that manipulate embryonic life
has exacerbated the perpetual tension between religious believers and non-believers on life issues. The political and cultural
influence wielded by that segment of believers known as "the
religious right" has grown increasingly controversial in proportion to its rising strength and publicity. At the same time, Roman
Catholic bishops have spoken out about how Catholic teaching
might influence the voting of Catholic politicians and the
faithful.
International events have also raised debate about the relationship between civil law and moral law. The world continually
witnesses tragedies attributable at least in part to the virulent
incompatibility between Islamic religious extremism and democratic governance. Is democratic government fundamentally
incompatible with Islamic Sharia law?
Historically, American democracy has accepted, and even
protected, religious belief and practice. However, the recent
debate over religion in public life is characterized by unprecedented polarization and particularly by vilification of those who
*
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view religion as politically relevant.1 Critics have lined up to
brand representatives of politically active religious movements as
"anti-democratic theocrats." 2 By seeking to impose their religious beliefs on all Americans, these critics charge, those whose
political activity is informed by religious belief threaten the very
foundations of our democracy.
Proponents of a role for religion in democracy, on the other
hand, charge that secularism is the real threat to democracy
because it denies government's essential orientation toward the
common good and the protection of fundamental human
rights.' Without some commitment to uphold moral principles,
democracy cannot preserve even such basic tenets as equality
before the law, and there is nothing keeping the democratic system from becoming an instrument serving the pure self-interest
of the majority. Thus, democracy without a moral (and perhaps
human person will
religious) commitment to the dignity of the
4
inevitably degrade into a form of tyranny.
One characteristic of this debate is that the battle lines do
not simply pit professed religious believers against avowed nonbelievers. In fact, some of the deepest trenches have appeared
within faith traditions. The most prominent recent example of
this is the debate among Roman Catholics in the United States
when several bishops in 2004 issued statements expressing an
obligation for Catholic politicians to exercise their political
power in a manner compatible with Catholic teaching on abor1. See, e.g., Peter Steinfels, Beliefs: Religion, Politics, and the Good-or
Harm-ThatMay Resultfrom the 2004 Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2004, at A15
noting a "hardening of lines between believers and nonbelievers," and that
"'[flaith-based' has become shorthand for all the charges of ideological stubbornness, national self-righteousness and blindness to evidence that the Iraq
war has inevitably pushed to the center of the presidential contest"); Maureen
Dowd, Vote and Be Damned, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2004, § 4, at 11 ("America is
awash in selective piety, situational moralists and cherry-picking absolutists.").
2. See, e.g., KEVIN PHILLIPS, AMERICAN THEOCRACY (2006) (arguing that
radical religion is one of several significant threats to the United States); see also
Ross Douthat, Theocracy, Theocracy, Theocracy!, 165 FIRST THINGS 23-30 (2006)
(reviewing four recent books that warn of imminent theocracy as a result of the
influence of conservative religious movements); see also Frank Rich, The Passion
of the Embryos, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2006, § 4, at 12 (characterizing Ralph Reed's
involvement in "religious-right" politics in the 1990s as "theocratic politics").
3. See, e.g., Robert P. George, The Tyrant State, 67 FIRST THINGS 39 (1996)
("Belief that laws and the regimes that make and enforce them must be evaluated by reference to universal standards ofjustice is shared by people of different faiths and of no particular faith. It is the premise of any serious conception
of human rights.").
RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION
4. See, e.g.,
AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1984).
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tion and other life issues.5 Even the leadership of the Catholic
Church in the United States could not agree on the appropriateness of these statements and their articulation of a necessary relationship between Catholics' civic responsibilities and the moral
law.6 Not surprisingly, the reaction to these statements was conflicted in the United States, especially among Catholic clergy,
scholars, and the faithful. For some, the Roman Catholic bishops' statements on voting may seem like alarming evidence that
the Roman Catholic Church aims to bring about a Catholic theocracy by imposing its religious beliefs on the American
populace.
The bishops' insistence on resistance to laws supporting
abortion can be traced to Pope John Paul II's 1995 encyclical
Evangelium Vitae, or "The Gospel of Life." 7 In that encyclical,
John Paul II refers to the "doctrine on the necessary conformity of
civil law with the moral law' that might itself be cited as evidence
of the Roman Catholic Church's anti-democratic impulses.
Among the implications of that doctrine are that any law purporting to allow abortion or euthanasia is illegitimate and
demands civil disobedience 9 and that no democracy could legitimately enshrine the choice to terminate a pregnancy or the life
5. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick & Laurie Goodstein, Group of Bishops
Using Influence to Oppose Keny, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at Al (characterizing
bishops' statements on "Catholic priorities" in voting as "converging" with
efforts by the Bush campaign to attract conservative Catholic voters and also
noting a "counterattack" from "liberal Catholics" against the bishops' statements); Steinfels, supra note 1 (noting polls measuring the Catholic vote in the
wake of the bishops' statements and the "moral pondering" of Catholic voters
over a number of issues).
6. See Interim Report by U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops' Task Force
on Catholic Bishops and Catholic Politicians, Interim Reflections of the Task
Force on Catholic Bishops and Catholic Politicians (June 15, 2004), in 34 OPIGINS 100, 106 (2004) (observing that "[t] here are also clear differences among
the bishops over sanctions for politicians-their appropriateness, wisdom, etc.
Among those who expressed a view, the majority were negative on refusing
communion by a margin of roughly 3-1."); see also Statement of U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Catholics in Political Life (June 18, 2004), in 34 ORiGINS 97, 99 (2004) (noting that "[b]ishops can legitimately make different
judgments on the most prudent course of pastoral action" with respect to
"whether the denial of holy communion to some Catholics in political life is
necessary because of their public support for abortion on demand"); John
Rather, Bishop Won't Deny Rites to Politicians, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2004, at L12
(noting different approaches taken by American bishops with regard to offering Communion to pro-choice politicians).
7.

POPE JOHN PAUL

IT OF HUMAN LIFE

8.
9.

II,

EVANGELIUM VITAE: ON THE VALUE AND INVIOLABI-

(1995) [hereinafter

EVANGELIUM VITAE].

Id. at para. 72 (emphasis added).
See id. at para. 73.
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of a disabled or elderly person as a "right,"1 as the Supreme
Court of the United States did in 1973.
Not surprisingly, given the active debate over these issues in
the United States, John Paul II's statement in Evangelium Vitae on
the "doctrine on the necessary conformity of civil law with the
moral law" was greeted with immediate suspicion by American
thinkers. Indeed, just after the encyclical's release, moral theologian Father Richard McCormick, S.J., predicted that the Pope's
discussion of that doctrine would remain the most controversial
element of the encyclical "after the dust settles."' 1
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Evangelium
Vitae's "doctrine on the necessary conformity of civil law with the
moral law" is not an anti-democratic call for the civil enforcement of Catholic moral principles. Such an interpretation inappropriately ignores John Paul II's central teachings on the
relationship between church and state, between moral law and
civil law, which he articulated most extensively in his 1991 encyclical Centesimus Annus. Although Evangelium Vitae is John Paul
II's most explicit treatment of the relationship between civil law
and moral law, his discussion there is limited to the implications
of the Church's teachings on life issues. John Paul II's teaching
on the general relationship between moral law and civil law cannot be understood without considering Evangelium Vitae in light
of his earlier and more comprehensive teachings on the relationship among church, state, and the individual human person.
First, we review Pope John Paul II's articulation of the "doctrine on the necessary conformity of civil law with the moral law"
in Evangelium Vitae, showing why some have interpreted this
teaching as an endorsement of theocracy. Next, we articulate the
central principles in the moral grammar of Pope John Paul II,
using the notion of subsidiarity as an entr6e into his moral vocabulary. With a particular focus on the terms "human rights,"
"human personhood," and "human freedom," we draw out the
moral grammar of PopeJohn Paul II by contrasting it with that of
John Locke. Next, we turn to Centesimus Annus, the Pope's 1991
encyclical in which he gives his most detailed account of the relationship between the social sphere and the political-juridical
sphere. In Centesimus Annus, John Paul II shows how subsidiarity
dictates separate spheres for moral and civil law; the state plays
10. See id. at para. 71.
11. Kevin P. Quinn, S.J., Whose Virtue? Which Morality? The Limits of Law as
a Teacher of Virtue, in CHOOSING LIFE: A DIALOGUE ON Evangelium Vitae, at 150
(Kevin Wm. Wildes, S.J. & Alan C. Mitchell eds., 1997) [hereinafter CHOOSING
LIFE] (citing Richard A. McCormick, The Gospel of Life, AMERICA, Apr. 29, 1995,
at 10, 12).
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only a supporting role in promoting compliance with the moral
law. We conclude by showing that the teaching of Evangelium
Vitae is consistent with the view presented in Centesimus Annus
because protection of the most fundamental of human rights is
consistent with the subsidiary role of the state.
I.

EVANGELIUM VITAE AND THE "NECESSARY CONFORMITY OF
CIVIL LAW WITH THE

MORAL LAw"

Pope John Paul II issued the encyclical Evangelium Vitae, or
"The Gospel of Life," on March 25, 1995. The Pope intended
the encyclical to be "a precise and vigorous reaffirmation of the value
of human life and its inviolability," as well as "a pressing appeal
addressed to each and every person in the name of God: respect,
protect, love and serve life, every human lifef'12 The encyclical begins
by setting forth the Pope's diagnosis of "present-day threats to
human life,"' 3 then proceeds to articulate the Christian message
on life as conveyed in scripture. 14 The third portion of the
encyclical addresses the implications of the Sixth Commandment, "You shall not kill." 15 In its final segment, the encyclical
envisions a "new culture of human life."' 6
In his elaboration of the moral law imposed by the Sixth
Commandment, the Pope dwells on the particularly grievous violations of that moral law represented by abortion and euthanasia. 7 Immediately thereafter, he turns from purely moral
considerations18 to consider the civil law's relationship to these
moral truths.

Ethical Relativism and Legal "Attacks on Human Life"
To begin, the Pope identifies various philosophical justifications underlying modern legal "attacks on human life." 19 Some
who support permissive abortion and euthanasia laws have
adopted a "proportionalist approach," whereby they view the
lives ended by an abortion or act of euthanasia as only "relative
good [s]" that do not measure up against the goods served by procuring an abortion or otherwise ending a life.2 ° Some would
declare abortion a "right" because they believe doing so will preA.

12.

EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 7, at para. 5 (emphasis added).

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at paras. 7-28.
Id. at paras. 29-51.
Id. at paras. 52-77.
Id. at paras. 78-105.
See id. at paras. 58-67.
See id. at paras. 68-74.
Id. at para. 68.

20.

Id.
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serve "civil coexistence" by delegating difficult moral judgments
to those most closely affected by the decision.2 1 Some believe
that, in the interest of enforceability and legitimacy, governments
should not legislate moral standards more rigorous than those
shared by all citizens. 22 The most radical justifications for such
laws rely on a theory of the state as a mere preserver of the "complete freedom" of born individuals and oppose restricting abortion because it would restrict absolute freedom by imposing one
particular "opinion" among many possible views.2 3
Not surprisingly, the Pope is critical of these arguments. He
first observes that they yield two opposing tendencies: on one
hand, the private claim, for oneself, of maximum autonomy to
make moral choices; on the other, the public claim that those
who govern must set aside their autonomous judgments out of
respect for those who might disagree, yielding entirely the conclusions of their individual consciences and limiting their considerations to that which is dictated by civil law.2 4 Moreover, he
argues, all of these justifications amount to versions of ethical
relativism, or the belief that all ethical positions are equally
valid.25
The Pope next considers the claim by some that ethical relativism is the only appropriate foundational philosophy for a
democracy, in that it promotes civility by requiring government
to refrain from imposing the beliefs of some upon all of society.
In response, the Pope points out the obvious truth that, whatever
one believes about abortion, anyone can identify certain abuses
of human dignity that even unanimous consensus could not legitimate. 26 A society based on pure ethical relativism would be powerless to prevent such abuses. Accordingly, pure ethical
relativism cannot be the foundational principle of a civilized
society.
B.

Democracy Is a "Means"for the Pursuit of Moral Ends

Because ethical relativism and pure consensus cannot form
the basis of a democratic system, the Pope argues, humans cannot pursue democracy as an end in itself, judging the legitimacy
of political decisions only according to whether they preserve
democratic civility.2 7 Instead, according to Pope John Paul II,
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
See id.
Id.
See EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 7, at para. 69.
See id. at para. 70.

26.
27.

See id.
See id.
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democracy is a system, or a "means" to some end. As such, its
moral legitimacy must be measured like that of any other human
the ends which it
activity: "its morality depends on the morality of
28
employs."
it
which
means
the
of
and
pursues
Thus, the relationship between the moral and the civil law
begins with a democratic system's commitment to the pursuit of
moral ends:
[T] he value of democracy stands or falls with the values
which it embodies and promotes. Of course, values such as
the dignity of every human person, respect for inviolable
and inalienable human rights, and the adoption of the
"common good" as the end and criterion regulating political life are certainly fundamental and not to be ignored.29
Since, as the Pope has pointed out, mere majority opinion cannot be relied upon to safeguard these fundamental values,
democracy must acknowledge "an objective moral law which, as
the 'natural law' written in the human heart, is the obligatory
point of reference for civil law itself."3
Without such an acknowledgement, democracy "would be
reduced to a mere mechanism for regulating different and
opposing interests on a purely empirical basis."3 1 Although this
alone might be valuable for the purpose of preserving peace, the
Pope argues that "peace which is not built upon the values of the
dignity of every individual and of solidarity between all people"
and, further, would "frequently
would be impossible to 3 preserve
2
prove[

] to be illusory."

The Role of Civil Law in PursuingMoral Ends
John Paul II then turns to considering the role of the civil
law in a democracy that acknowledges an "objective moral law"
and accepts that moral law as "the obligatory point of reference
for civil law."' 3 Seeking "the basic elements of a vision of the relationship between civil law and moral law," the Pope starts by emphasizing the limited purpose and responsibilities of the civil law.3 4
The civil law is "limited in scope" compared to the moral law,
and it can never "take the place of conscience. '"" Its "real purC.

28.

Id.

29.

EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note

30.

Id.

31.

Id. (citing POPE JOHN PAUL II, VERITATIS SPLENDOR: THE SPLENDOR OF

7, at para. 70.

TRUTH paras. 97, 99 (1993) [hereinafter VERITATIS SPLENDOR]).
32. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 7, at para. 70.

33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id. at para. 71 (emphasis added).
Id.

78

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 21

pose" is "to guarantee an ordered social coexistence in true
justice ....""6

In order to bring about such an "ordered coexistence," civil
law's responsibilities, according to the Pope, include "ensur[ing]
that all members of society enjoy respect for certain fundamental
rights which innately belong to the person .

.

. ."" Primary

among these fundamental rights is "the inviolable right to life of
every innocent human being."3

John Paul II anticipates the objection that respect for individuals requires civil law to leave decisions about abortion and
euthanasia to the realm of personal freedom or individual conscience. He responds that the fundamental right to life must be
protected by civil law precisely because it is so easily abused in
the name of conscience: "[S] ociety has the right and the duty to
protect itself against the abuses which can occur in the name of
conscience and under the pretext of freedom."3 9
Quoting Pacem in Terris, a 1963 encyclical letter of Pope John
XXIII, John Paul II emphasizes that it is essential for the common good and for the very legitimacy of civil law that civil authorities safeguard fundamental human rights such as the right to
life:
"[T] o safeguard the inviolable rights of the human person
and to facilitate the performance of his duties is the principal duty of every public authority." Thus any government
which refused to recognize human rights or acted in violation of them would not only fail in its duty; its decrees
would be wholly lacking in binding force.4 °
John Paul II terms this conclusion the "doctrine on the necessary conformity of civil law with the moral law."4 He emphasizes
its roots in the tradition of the Church as far back as St. Thomas
Aquinas, who wrote: "Every law made by man can be called a law
insofar as it derives from the natural law. But if it is somehow
36.
37.

Id.
Id.

38.
39.

Id.
EVANGELIUM VITAE,

supra note 7, at para. 71. (citing

SECOND VATICAN

para.
is an
example of his disagreement with his interlocutors about the true meanings of
"conscience" and "freedom." See discussion infra Parts II, IV.
40. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 7, at para. 71 (citing POPE JOHN XXIII,
PACEM IN TERRIS: PEACE ON EARTH paras. 60-61 (1963)).
41. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 7, at para. 72 (emphasis added).
COUNCIL, DIGNITATIS HuMANAE: THE DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
7 (1966) [hereinafter DIGNITATIS HuMANAE]). The Pope's objection here

JOHN PAUL H ON CIVIL LAW AND MORAL LAW

20071

opposed to the natural 4law,
then it is not really a law but rather a
2
corruption of the law."

D.

The Role of Civil Law in ProhibitingAbortion and Euthanasia

Turning to the implications of this doctrine for the evils of
abortion and euthanasia, Pope John Paul II argues that prohibiting these practices is the "first and most immediate" element of
the civil law's obligation to protect fundamental rights.4 This is
because laws that allow abortion and euthanasia attack the inviolable right to life, which is "the fundamental right and source of
all other rights."44 Disregard for this most fundamental of rights
"is what most directly conflicts with the possibility of achieving
the common good" because it "leads to the killing of the person
whom society exists to serve."4 5 Because laws permitting abortion
and euthanasia thus attack the most fundamental right due to
every human being, in the process doing violence to the very
foundation of society, the Pope concludes that "a civil law authorizing abortion or euthanasia ceases by that very fact to be a true,
morally binding civil law."4 6
E. Civil Disobedience
Having established the invalidity of laws purporting to allow
abortion and euthanasia, the Pope next articulates "the grave and
clear obligation to oppose [such laws] by conscientious objection"4": "[I] t
is . . .never licit to obey . . .or to 'take part in a propaganda
campaign in favor of ...or vote for"' an "intrinsically unjust law,

such as a law permitting abortion or euthanasia."4 8 The Pope
carefully notes that this does not prohibit a politician whose
"absolute personal opposition to procured abortion was well
known" from supporting a measure aimed at "limiting the harm"
done by a law generally permitting abortion.4" The Pope concludes by articulating the personal moral obligation not to coop42.

Id. (quoting THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, I-1I, Q. 95, Art.

43.

EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 7, at para. 72.

44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id.

2).

47. Id. at para. 73 (emphasis added).
48. Id. (quoting Hieronymus Hamer, Titular Archbishop of Lorium,
Sec'y of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on
Procured Abortion (June 28, 1974), available at www.vatican.va/roman curia/

congregations/

cfaith/documents/rc con cfaith doc 19741118 declaration-

abortion en.html).
49. EVANGELUUM VITAE, supra note 7, at para. 73 (emphasis added).
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erate in evil actions, such as procured abortion or euthanasia,
and the obligation of civil law to protect individuals' essential
right to choose not to participate in such actions.50

II.

THE

"NEw BABEL"

One reason that Pope John Paul II's view of the relation
between civil law and moral law is misunderstood stems from a
problem in language. A prominent feature of the contemporary
world, especially as English has emerged as the world language, is
that the "words by which key concepts are expressed take on
quite different meanings in diverse ideological systems."5 We
term this problem a "new Babel."
In the biblical story of the Tower of Babel, we are told of a
time when "the whole earth had one language." 52 In an effort to
make a name for themselves, the people tried to build a city and
a tower that rose to the heavens. In response, the Lord said,
"Come, let us go down, and there confuse their language, that
they may not understand one another's speech."5" In the Genesis
narrative, we are told that God introduced confusion by multiplying languages. Each language, with its own grammar and vocabulary, used different terms to describe the same (or similar)
realities, so those who spoke Hebrew were unable to understand
those who spoke Greek or Egyptian and so forth. This was the
problem of the old Babel.
Now we find ourselves in a new Babel, where the situation is
inverted. Although there are still many places in the world
where the translation problems of the old Babel exist, English
has now emerged as a world language.5 4 Sharing a language
raises a new kind of linguistic confusion. In the new Babel, language is confused, not by multiplying words, but by using the
same words to mean different things. Terms and concepts that
have a specific meaning within one way of life or grammar can be
50.
51.

Id. at para. 74.

52.
53.

Genesis 11:1.
Genesis 11:7.

54.

See

SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, GAUDIUM ET SPES: PASTORAL CONSTITUTION
ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD para. 4 (1965).

ATLAS OF THE WORLD'S LANGUAGES IN DANGER OF DISAPPEARING

(Stephen A. Wurm ed., 2d ed. 2001) (1996) (noting that, as of the 1990s, it is
estimated that there are about six thousand languages spoken in the world and
that half of them are likely to disappear in the foreseeable future); see also
RACHEL McALPINE, GLOBAL ENGLISH FOR GLOBAL BUSINESS (2005) (observing
that approximately 375 million people speak English as a first language and
that more than one billion people use English as a foreign language).
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drained of their content-sometimes unwittingly and over long
periods of time-then refilled with a different meaning.
The term "freedom" provides an example of this phenomenon. "Freedom" originally connoted the bonds of love and
friendship. In Norse mythology, Fri (for whom Friday is named)
was the goddess of love. She remained with Odin, her husband,
not because she was coerced, like Odin's slaves, but because she
loved him. The word "friend" developed out of this connection
between freedom and love, in recognition that we feel most free
with our friends and those with whom we share the bonds of love
and family. Now, however, many contemporary speakers see the
bonds of love as an infringement on freedom. Despite its etymology, these thinkers use freedom to signify the lack of constraints,
or the ability to do whatever one wants without regard for others.
Thus, in the new Babel, two people professing a commitment to
"freedom" might mean two different things. One person's freedom is another's slavery.
A variety of thinkers have recognized the phenomenon of
the new Babel in different contexts.5 5 In the natural sciences,
Thomas Kuhn has shown that key scientific concepts (such as
matter and energy) mean different things in distinct paradigms.
Aristotle, Newton, and Einstein all discuss "matter" and "energy,"
but although each borrowed from his predecessors, there are
subtle but significant differences in the way each understood
these terms.5 6 Of course, among practicing scientists, the Aristotelian understanding of "matter" is a museum piece, suitable only
for historical study. With terms significant to moral and social
life, unfortunately, the situation is more complicated.
Alasdair MacIntyre has traced several distinct understandings of the meaning of 'justice." Focusing on the moral grammar of Aristotle, St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and David
Hume, MacIntyre shows that each of these paradigms is concerned with 'justice," yet each has a distinctive understanding of
what it means to be 'just," as well as what qualifies as "rational."5 7
As MacIntyre argues, contemporary moral and social life is complicated by the fact that those engaged in moral and social

55. Cf JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL: THE LANGUAGES OF MORAIS
AND THEIR DiscoNTETrs (1988) (using the Babel metaphor in a slightly different way than suggested here).

56.
(1996).

See

THOMAS

57.

See

ALASDAIR

(1988).

KUHN,

THE

MACINTYRE,

STRUCTURE

WHOSE

OF

SCIENTIFIC

JUSTICE,

WHICH

REVOLUTIONS

RATIONALITY?
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debate frequently employ an apparently common moral vocabulary but endow the shared words with distinctive meanings.5"
MacIntyre's insight with respect to traditions of justice is
equally true of the concepts "rights," "personhood," and "freedom" in contemporary moral and social debate. These notions
are used in very different ways, unwittingly drawing from distinct
traditions. What one paradigm considers liberating, another
considers enslaving, and vice versa. To use abortion as an example, that which is viewed as a "right" by some is considered by
others to be plainly wrong.
Thus, in order to understand Pope John Paul II's account of
the relation between moral law and civil law, one must understand his distinctive moral grammar. What does he mean by
"rights," "personhood," and "freedom"? In what distinctive way
has he extended the vocabulary of the Church? How does his
use of those terms differ from other thinkers with which some
might be more familiar? In order to get at these questions, we
find it helpful to begin with the notion of subsidiarity.
III.

STARTING WITH SUBSIDIALTY

To understand the moral grammar of Pope John Paul II, it
seems helpful to start with subsidiarity. Because the notion of
subsidiarity originated in the tradition of Catholic social thought,
it is not as prone to the problems of the new Babel. Thus, understanding subsidiarity is a helpful way to understand the grammar
implicit in the vocabulary of Catholic social thought.
Unfortunately, this pedagogical approach is not widespread.
For example, in their 1998 statement, Sharing Catholic Social
Teaching: Challenges and Directions, the U.S. bishops make virtually
no mention of subsidiarity.5 9 Instead, they begin with the notion
of "human dignity." The bishops state:
[T] he Catholic Church proclaims that human life is sacred
and that the dignity of the person is the foundation of a
moral vision for society. Our belief in the sanctity of
human life and the inherent dignity of the human person
58.

See ALASDAIR MAcINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY

(1981) (This is Maclntyre's diagnosis of the interminable character of contemporary moral debates. The debates are interminable, he thinks, precisely
because the interlocutors fail to recognize that they are using the same words to
mean different things.).
59. See Statement of U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Sharing Catholic Social Teaching: Challenges and Directions (June 19, 1998), in 28 ORIGINS
102 (1999).
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is the foundation
of all the principles of our social
60
teaching.
In the new Babel, the bishops face a difficult task trying to
explain Catholic social teaching through the lens of the "dignity
of the person," particularly to an American audience. What
could be more American than emphasizing that every human
being has dignity and equal rights? Virtually every American citizen already is committed to respecting human dignity as a central civic and secular belief. It is a mistake to situate the debate as
between those who are "for" human dignity and those who are
"against" it. Rather, there is widespread cultural disagreement
about what respecting human dignity entails. For example, the
bishops teach that abortion and euthanasia are violations of the
dignity of the human person, but others in American society consider limiting access to abortion or euthanasia to be a violation of
human dignity.
Thus, in order to instruct on "human dignity" or any other
concept in Catholic social teaching, the bishops must illuminate
the unique grammar of Catholic social teaching. Only an understanding of the Church's use of terms that are shared with other
moral grammars can eliminate the confusion produced by the
multiple meanings of the key terms in the debate and allow for a
reasoned account of why the Church's way of using those terms is
preferable.
The danger of confusion is particularly acute when it comes
to the concept of "human dignity." Unfortunately, the bishops
have not given us much to help us understand why human dignity is "foundational." At the same time, secular thinkers have
done a great deal to try to establish this claim. From Hobbes to
Rorty, virtually every modem thinker concerned with moral and
social philosophy has been committed to the claim of equal
human dignity. Modern secular thinkers nearly universally justify
the claim of equal human dignity in terms of skepticism about
human goodness. Roughly, the argument is that human beings
cannot have knowledge about human goodness, so we must
respect the rights of individuals to make their own choices. That
belief has, in many ways, become the foundation of American
61
moral and social life.
This secular justification of equal dignity is quite different
from, even opposed to, the understanding of the dignity of the
60.
61.

Id. at 104.
For a detailed account of the history of modem liberalism and its

various efforts tojustify equal rights, see
AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 31-38 (2001).

ROBERT

P.

KRAYNAK, CHRISTIAN FAITH
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human person that Catholic social thought advances. While secular thinkers rely on our lack of knowledge about goodness, the
Church's understanding of "human dignity" and "human personhood" arises from theological and philosophical knowledge
claims about the truth of a good human life. A great deal of
intellectual work is needed to distinguish the Church's understanding of the dignity of the human person from the various
understandings of the same ideal advanced in secular culture.
Thus, rather than beginning with the "dignity of the person," we believe it is helpful to start with subsidiarity. This is not
to say that subsidiarity is foundational, though it is important to
the Church's social teaching. Instead, we believe it is helpful to
start with subsidiarity in part because it is a term without many
rival interpretations, at least in the United States.6 2 As such, it is
easily understood on distinctly Catholic terms, and it is helpful in
illuminating the moral grammar of Catholic social thought since
it intersects with, orients, and helps develop other central concepts. Thus, if we develop an understanding of the principle of
subsidiarity, it will help bring about the gestalt shift that is
needed to understand the rest of the moral grammar used by
Pope John Paul II.
A.

Definition of "Subsidiarity"

It is helpful to start with a basic dictionary meaning of the
term "subsidiarity." Even here, many Americans will find a challenge, since most dictionaries do not include the word "subsidiarity." In The Oxford English Dictionary (OED), only the
Supplement includes a definition of "subsidiarity": "the principle
that a central authority should have a subsidiary function, performing only those tasks that cannot be performed effectively at
a more immediate or local level."'6 ' The OED goes on to trace
the etymology of the word to the 1931 papal encyclical,
62. The situation is quite different in Europe. For the last twenty years or
so, subsidiarity has played a central part in debates over the development of the
European Union. Because the notion of subsidiarity is now written into that
body's constitution, many European debates involve subsidiarity. See Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310),
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtm.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:EN:
HTML. Of course, that is not to say that Europeans are any clearer than Americans on all of the implications and presuppositions of subsidiarity, particularly
as used by the Catholic Church. However, it would not be uncommon in
Europe to read an editorial or hear a political speech that employs the concept
of subsidiarity. In contrast, public discourse in North America about subsidiarity is almost non-existent.
63. 4 A SUPPLEMENT TO THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (R.W. Burchfield ed., 1986).
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QuadragesimoAnno, and makes mention of several authors writing
in the area of Christian social doctrine who use the concept.6 4
For example, Wogaman uses the term in his book Christian
Method of MoralJudgment, explaining that "social problems should
be dealt with at the most immediate (or local) level consistent
with their solution."6 5
A simple example illustrates this idea. Imagine a meeting
set in a rural county. At the head table are government officials
and business leaders interested in building a nuclear power plant
in a rural location. Attending the meeting are local residents.
The locals ask various questions, sometimes with an angry tone,
but as they lack professional expertise, both in public speaking
and in the relevant sciences, the locals seem to be losing the
argument. Finally, one of them asks, "Do any of you up there live
nearby?" Not surprisingly, none of the experts on the panel lives
within fifty miles of the proposed site of the nuclear power plant.
Like this example, the principle of subsidiarity calls attention to the importance of social leaders attending to local participation in the decision-making process. But this is only one
aspect of the notion of subsidiarity. For a more subtle understanding of subsidiarity, let us turn to Quadragesimo Anno, the
1931 encyclical on social reform.
B.

QuadragesimoAnno

The concept of subsidiarity is first articulated by the Church
in paragraph 79 of QuadragesimoAnno:
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they
can accomplish by their own initiative and industry and
give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the
same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to
assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and
subordinate organizations can do. For every social activity
ought of its very nature to furnish help to the members
of
66
the body social, and never destroy and absorb them.
In this, the classic formulation of the principle of subsidiarity, it
is possible to detect three essential components.
First, "it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they
can accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to
64.

65.
MENT 142

66.

Id.
Id. (citingJ. PHILIP

WOGAMAN,

A CHRISTIAN METHOD OF MORAL JUDG-

(1976)).
POPE PIus XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO: ON RECONSTRUCTING THE SOCIAL

ORDER para. 79 (1931).
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the community."" In other words, each person is endowed with
the ability to make self-determining choices ordered to the common good. Through the choices one makes, one actualizes oneself, shaping one's character and becoming more fully the
person one is. As human persons, we perfect ourselves through
the choices we make, and we realize ourselves through our
actions. For example, the decision about one's vocation in life,
whether one is called to marriage or to be single or to live a religious life, is a decision to be made by the person so called. It
would be gravely wrong for others to force such a decision upon
a person. Social groups have the responsibility to allow individual human persons the space to make their own self-determining
choices ordered toward the common good.
Second, "it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil
and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher
association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do." 6 8
In other words, there is a gradation in social institutions, both
with regard to size and with regard to formality. Smaller and less
formal social institutions, such as the family, neighborhoods, parishes, and local associations, should be allowed to make their
own self-determining choices ordered toward the common good.
For example, decisions about how to educate one's children,
where to send them to school, and how to raise them in a way
that promotes their development as persons in light of the common good, are decisions that are properly made at the level of
the family, for example, by the husband and wife. A family is
shaped by the way it makes those kinds of decisions and is perfected through the habits developed in living out those decisions.
Hence, it is a disturbance of right order for a higher and larger
social group, such as the state, to take from a smaller and lower
social institution, such as the family, the ability to govern itself in
a manner ordered toward the common good.
Third, "every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help to the members of the body social, and never destroy
and absorb them."6" In other words, the activities of higher and
larger social institutions should be attentive to smaller and lower
social institutions in such a way that interventions should be
aimed at providing support for those goods internal to the
smaller group. Higher and larger groups may sometimes need to
intervene in the activities of smaller and lower groups, but that
intervention should be aimed at helping the smaller group better
67.

4A

68.
69.

Id.
Id.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note

63.
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pursue those goods appropriate to it in light of the common
good.
To summarize, the principle of subsidiarity includes three
essential components: (1) authorities and social leaders should
respect the capacity of individual persons to make self-determining choices oriented towards the common good; (2) authorities
and social leaders in higher and larger social institutions should
be attentive to smaller groups, allowing them to make self-governing decisions within boundaries established by the common
good; and (3) authorities and social leaders should offer assistance to individual persons or smaller groups, and when such
persons or groups are failing to fulfill their functions, interventions should be limited to assistance that does not destroy or
absorb the person or group involved.
The etymology of the term "subsidiarity" is itself illustrative
of these principles. The word can be traced to ancient Rome.
When Roman military leaders planned strategy, they relied frequently on a "subsidium," a group that would sit behind in case
extra support was needed. The role of the "subsidium" (literally,
to sit behind) is to lend help and support in case of need. Similarly, according to the principle of subsidiarity, the role of the
state and other higher social institutions is to "sit behind" smaller
institutions and lend help and support only in case of need.
C. John Paul I on "Subsidiarity"
The notion of subsidiarity is widespread in the social encyclicals of modern Catholic social teaching. The idea is implicit in
Rerum Novarum,7 ° the 1891 magna carta of Catholic social
thought on the condition of the working class, and then made
explicit in the 1931 encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno, as mentioned. 7 From that time to the present, the notion of subsidiarity continuously has played a central role in papal teaching.
Building on that tradition, the habit of thinking about social
questions in terms of the principle of subsidiarity permeated the
statements of Pope John Paul II. In almost every case where he
spoke out in defense of human dignity-from the workers in
Eastern Europe to persecuted Tibetan monks, from the unborn
and the infirm to the problems of consumerism and materialism-he emphasized that authorities and social leaders should
respect the capacity of individual persons to make responsible
self-determining choices oriented towards the common good. At
70. See POPE LEO XIII, RERUM NOvARuM: ON
(1891) [hereinafter RERUM NOvARzuM].
71.

THE CONDITION OF WORKERS

See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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the same time, the state should be attentive to smaller groups,
allowing them to make self-governing decisions within boundaries established by the common good, intervening only when
needed, but never in a way that destroys individual persons or
smaller communities.
Pope John Paul II also wrote explicitly about the principle of
subsidiarity. In his 1991 encyclical, Centesimus Annus, he provided his own reformulation of the principle of subsidiarity:
[A] community of a higher order should not interfere in
the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving
the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in
case of need and help to coordinate its activity with the
activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the
common good.72
John Paul II's emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity, with
its careful preservation of human freedom to pursue the common good, is helpful in beginning to understand the distinctive
way that Pope John Paul II uses key terms such as "human person," "human dignity," and especially, "human freedom." For a
fuller account, we will next examine three concepts related to
subsidiarity that Pope John Paul II used in distinctive ways.
IV.

THE

MORAL GRAMMAR

OF JOHN PAUL

II

The principle of subsidiarity provides a helpful entrance
into the moral grammar of Pope John Paul II by providing an
implicit understanding of what he means by central moral terms,
particularly "freedom" and "personhood." The next step is to
build up our understanding of John Paul II's moral grammar by
explicitly analyzing three key terms in the moral grammar of
Pope John Paul II: "human rights," "human personhood," and
"human freedom."
As Americans, we tend to have absorbed the grammar of
individualism. In many ways, modern American life is the natural home for the terms we seek to understand. However, the
American founders borrowed much of their understanding of
these terms from English philosopher John Locke. To demonstrate how John Paul II has made each of these terms his own,
developing a distinctive moral grammar out of terms already
familiar to contemporary readers, we will understand these terms
by glancing at the wayJohn Locke used them and juxtaposing his
72. POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS: ON THE HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY OF RERUM NOVARUM para. 48 (1991) [hereinafter CENTESIMUS ANNUS].
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understanding with the way each is used in the moral grammar
of Pope John Paul II.
A.

Human Rights

What is a "right," according to John Paul II? To make
explicit the distinctive way that John Paul II uses the language of
rights, we situate his use of rights language in the tradition of
modem Catholic social teaching after contrasting it with the
rights language of Lockean individualism.
As John Locke and countless other modern thinkers have
understood the term, a right is a justified claim, either of immunity or entitlement, made against those in authority.7 3 And how
are rights justified? There has been a wide-ranging debate
among modem human rights theorists, but virtually all have
held, in one way or another, that rights are justified because we
lack knowledge of the good."4 Robert Kraynak provides this summary of the modem notion of human rights:
Rights are designed to prevent authorities of all kinds
(political, religious, paternal) from interfering in one's life
in the name of superior wisdom and virtue or to assert
their arbitrary power. "Don't tread on me!" was the slogan
of the Sons of Liberty during the American Revolution that
expressed this view of rights. Such rights demand a zone
of privacy that is off-limits to the state. They may even go
further and75 demand goods and services from political
authorities.

This understanding of human rights culminates in what Stanley
Brubaker terms a "dogmatic doubt that we can ever know what is
good for man and 76woman or that there even is such a thing as
the human good.

Although Pope John Paul II makes frequent use of the
notion of a human right as a claim against political authorities,
he has a very different understanding of the basis of human
rights. Indeed, under the leadership of Pope John Paul II, the
Vatican emerged as perhaps the world's leading defender of
human rights, including the rights of Polish workers, the right to
73. See KRAYNAK, supra note 61, at 16-38 (providing a helpful summary of
modern rights theory).
74. See id.
75. Id. at 22.
76. Stanley C. Brubaker, Tribe and the Transformation of American Constitutional Law, 4 BENCHMARK 109, 122 (1990) (adopted from Rewriting the Constitution, COMMENTARY (1988)).
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religious freedom in China, and the right to life for the unborn
and aged in post-industrial secular societies.
In using rights language, John Paul II followed the development in doctrine advanced during the Second Vatican Council,
especially in DignitatisHumanae, the document on religious freedom.7 7 The teaching of the Council is subtle but significant.
Dignitatis Humanae affirms that there is a strong tendency in
modernity to prize freedom, rights, and autonomy. The first line
of Dignitatis Humanae, which John Paul II frequently quoted,
states:
A sense of the dignity of the human person has been
impressing itself more and more deeply on the consciousness of contemporary man, and the demand is increasingly
made that men should act on their own judgment,
enjoying and making use of a responsible freedom,78 not
driven by coercion but motivated by a sense of duty.
Next, Dignitatis Humanae affirms that there is a right to religious
freedom:
This Vatican Council declares that the human person has a
right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all
men are to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals or of social groups and of any human power, in
such wise [sic] that in religious matters no one is to be
79
forced to act in a manner contrary to his own conscience.
In other words, governments should not use the coercive power
of the law to pressure citizens into particular religious beliefs or
practices.
It might seem that the Council is merely affirming what
moderns have known all along. Especially to Americans, the
affirmation of a right to religious freedom in the late twentieth
century might seem insignificant. Every American citizen knows
that there is a right to religious freedom and that government
has no business using its coercive power to force particular religious beliefs. Indeed, one might ask whether the Roman Catholic
Church is actually a latecomer to the discussion of rights. If
enlightened thinkers have endorsed the concept of rights,
emphasizing especially the right to religious freedom, for almost
two centuries, then the Church's affirmation of such a right is
remarkable only because it comes very late in the history of rights
language.
77. See generally DIGNITATIS HuMANAE, supra note 39.
78. Id. at prbl.
79.

Id. at para. 2.
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However, the Church's account of human rights is crucially
different from the justification for rights advanced by most modern rights theorists. If a right is a justified claim against those in
authority, what is the justification given? Why is it that each person is to be immune from coercion such that no one is to be
forced to act in a manner contrary to his or her own beliefs?
Dignitatis Humanae explains and defends the right to religious
freedom by stating that this right "has its foundation not in the
subjective disposition of the person, but in his very nature."'
The right to religious freedom "has its foundation in the very
dignity of the human person."81

George Weigel has called this development in rights theory
the "Catholic human rights revolution." 2 This development in
Catholic doctrine is a "revolution" in a narrow sense. It is neither
a reversal in Church teaching nor a wholesale endorsement of
the modern theory of rights. Two things in particular are "revolutionary" about the Church's use of rights language. First, the
Roman Catholic Church has shifted from nineteenth century suspicion about the use of rights language to a twenty-first century
position where the Vatican is perhaps the world's most articulate
advocate of human rights.8
Second, the Church has shifted what is meant by a "right."
The liberalism that made freedom of religion a cornerstone of
democratic government was based on a philosophy of individualism.8 4 In that outlook, each individual operates as a law unto
himself, and society is merely a collection of autonomous individuals. Just as each individual is subject solely to self-law, society as
a whole cannot be accountable to an imposed external standard.8 5 Hence, the state must be agnostic or atheistic. In this
view, religious freedom guarantees that the state will not be
accountable to any standard other than the will of the people.
Each individual is allowed to hold any religious beliefs, as long as
they are kept private. The public square must remain naked,
devoid of any religious beliefs under which the state could be
challenged.8 6
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
George Weigel, The Catholic Human Rights Revolution, CRIss, July/Aug.

1996, at 36; see also GEORGE

WEIGEL, CATHOLICISM AND THE RENEWAL OF AMERI-

84, 98 (1989); Kenneth Grasso, Liberalism, Democratic Capitalism,
and the Catholic Human Rights Revolution, 17 FAITH & REASON 413 (1991).

CAN DEMOCRACY

83.
84.

See Grasso, supra note 82.
See id.

85.

See id. at 416-17.

86.

Id.
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This view contains a serious internal contradiction, however.
Because it bases human rights on the claims that each individual
is a law unto himself and that it is impossible to know what is
good for anyone other than oneself, this view slides inevitably
into relativism, and thereby undermines all possible grounds for
justice." 7 What began as a desire to bring about a more just
social order ends up in post-modern relativism.
Of course, this problem is a widely recognized feature of
post-modern life. Richard Rorty captures this internal contradiction in modern liberalism, recognizing that it is impossible to
give any objective justification for human rights according to the
standards of enlightenment rationality. Rorty argues that democracy and human rights, which he strongly endorses, are ultimately a matter of personal preference."8 Human rights turn out
to be claims of immunity or entitlement made against those in
authority and justified by mere personal preference. Why should
we endorse the practices of those modern institutions that
respect and defend human rights? Because we like them and
they work.
In contrast, Pope John Paul II endorses and defends those
modern institutions that defend human rights without endorsing
skepticism about human nature and the modern tendency to
think that the public square must be secular, naked, and devoid
of religious substance. In the post-Vatican II moral grammar 8of9
John Paul II, human rights are grounded in the human person.
87.

See id. at 418-20.

88.

See generally RIcHARD

RORTY,

CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND

SOLIDARITY

(1989).
89. Cathleen Kaveny objects to John Paul II's endorsement of using the
civil law to criminalize abortion and euthanasia, basing her criticism on his use
of rights language. See M. Cathleen Kaveny, The Limits of Ordinary Virtue: The
Limits of the Criminal Law in Implementing Evangelium Vitae, in CHOOSING LIFE,
supra note 11, at 132. Kaveny argues that the criminal law should allow access
to abortion without criminal penalty; further, she suggests that the way to
reduce abortions is to increase government regulation and support of health
care. See id. at 147.
Kaveny presents several arguments against using rights language, but her
central claim is that rights language "is inadequate as a basis for public policy
because it is underdetermined from a moral point of view" since every claim to
a fundamental human right can be countered by someone else's claim to a
different, conflicting right. Id. at 134. Kaveny states that rights language is an
insufficient basis for civil law because it is merely "a sort of 'shorthand' for our
unexpressed full-blown moral theory." Id. at 136. She argues that, in using the
language of rights, John Paul II has failed to provide a robust account of what it
is to flourish as a person. In fact, Kaveny goes so far as to faultJohn Paul II for
hiding behind rights language rather than providing "the rich moral vision of
human flourishing" that is needed to engage others and forge consensus. Id.
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Each human being has rights because each human being is a person. John Paul II grounds this position in a highly developed
account of what it means to be a human person.
B.

Human Personhood

What is a human person, according to John Paul II? To
make explicit the distinctive way that John Paul II uses the language of personhood, we draw attention to the Lockean notion
of personhood and then contrast it with the way John Paul II
understands human personhood.
In John Locke's philosophical writings, he focused on the
notion of personhood to unravel several apparent puzzles about
personal identity. 9° In particular, he aimed to integrate modern
mechanistic physics with the received religious views of Christianity regarding immortality. To solve these puzzles, he followed
the modern tendency to think of human beings as a composite of
91
two distinct substances, one physical and the other immaterial.
92
immaterial.
the
with
solely
He identified personality
In a famous thought experiment, Locke reasons as follows. 9"
Imagine two creatures: one is a rational talking parrot and the
other is a creature shaped as a human but which cannot engage
in rational discourse. The one looks like a bird but acts like a
person, able to talk and engage in philosophical discourse; the
other looks like a human being but is completely unable to use
language, think, discourse, and participate in those activities that
we consider distinctive to persons. Locke thinks that this
thought experiment shows that there is a difference between
being a person and being a human. To sort out what makes
Kaveny's arguments fail to contextualize the distinct moral grammar of
John Paul II and to distinguish his use of key terms, particularly "rights" and
"person," from the way those terms are used by other modem thinkers. In
characterizing John Paul 1I's view of rights and their interaction with the civil
law, Kaveny focuses almost solely on Chapter 3 of Evangelium Vitae, rather than
situating John Paul II's argument about abortion in that encyclical within the
large corpus of both his life's work and the many Vatican statements about
human rights, which began in earnest with Pope John XXIII. The charge that
John Paul II does not provide a rich understanding of what it means to flourish
as a "human person" cannot stand when considered against John Paul II's written work prior to and during his pontificate. John Paul II's nuanced account of
human personhood is widely considered one of his great contributions to the
intellectual life of the Church. See infra Part V.B.
90. SeeJOHN LoCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Kenneth P. Winkler ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1996) (1689).
91. See id. at 138-44.
92.

See id.

93.

Id. at 138.
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someone a person, he assumes the standard modern split
between the mind and the body. The body is what makes us
human, but the mind is what makes someone a person. Locke
writes, "since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and 'tis
that, that makes everyone to be, what he calls self, and thereby
distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone
consists personal identity, i.e., the sameness of a rational being."9 4
Thus, for Locke, a person is an intelligent thinking being
that can know itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different
times and places. 5 On Locke's account, being a person is a subjective performance of rational reflection. Following Locke, one
might say, "So long as I experience myself as a person and am
able to connect my current subjective state with earlier memories, then my personhood is intact."
John Paul II's understanding of personhood is significantly
different from this Lockean notion of personhood as a disembodied state of subjective consciousness. Fundamentally, John
Paul II rejected the dualism of the mind-body split. He held that
human personhood is embodied and inextricably interconnected with concrete existence.
In the moral grammar of John Paul II, two distinctive traditions are synthesized in the notion of personhood. On the one
hand, he is retrieving the ancient and medieval emphasis on substance.9 6 On the other hand, he is drawing from the modern
turn to the subject and modernity's concern with personality,
reflective consciousness, and intersubjective awareness. 9 7 He
affirms the importance of reflective consciousness to perfect and
fully realize human personhood, but John Paul II rejects the
modern claim that personality consists in reflexive consciousness
alone.
In his pre-pontifical writings, Karol Wojtyla mined the philosophical insights of Thomas Aquinas and creatively applied them
to the human person. Following Thomas Aquinas, Wojtyla uses
Boethius's classical philosophical definition of "person" as "an
individual substance of a rational nature."" Thomas Aquinas
employed that definition to examine in detail questions about
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id.
96. See KAROL WoJn'LA, Thomistic Personalism, in PERSON AND COMMUNTY
165 (Theresa Sandok trans., 1993) [hereinafter Thomistic Personalism] (This is a
pre-pontifical essay in which Karol Wojtyla traced the history of the concept of
the "person.").
97. See id.

98.

Id. at 167.
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the personhood of the Trinity and the Incarnation." 9 St.
Thomas's driving concerns are theological, but within his theological writing, he develops several profound philosophical
insights about personhood.1 °° In his essay, Thomistic Personalism,
Wojtyla draws attention to an insight from the work of Thomas
Aquinas: "A rational nature does not possess its own subsistence
as a nature, but subsists in a person. The person is a subsistent
subject of existence and action-which can in no way be said of a
rational nature."' 1 Because the person is a subsistent subject of
existence and action, rather than a Lockean free-floating pure
consciousness, personhood is inextricably tied up with the substance of a person's being and with one's nature-that is, with
the kind of being a thing is." 2 Wojtyla holds that because the
person is a subsistent subject of existence and action, human personhood subsists in our nature as human beings.'0 3 Our entire
being is personal, including our bodies, our desires, our emotions, our relationships, our thoughts, our decisions, and our
activities. 10
This account of the human person is developed most fully in
Wojtyla's pre-pontifical philosophical magnum opus, The Acting
Person.' 5 His project is a phenomenological argument describ99. See id. at 166-69.
100. See id. at 168. In the writings of St. Thomas, these insights about
personhood, being, and nature were all part of his theological discussion: the
Divine Persons subsist in the Divine Being. See id. Wojtyla uses the philosophical features of this insight to focus on the human person. In fact, in Wojtyla's
extensive pre-pontifical writings, he wrote almost exclusively about the human
person.
101. Id. at 167.
102. See Thomistic Personalism, supra note 96, at 170.
103. See id. at 175.
104. Although it deserves fuller treatment, this subtle point of metaphysics is involved in John Paul II's view that every living human being is a person,
even during the earliest and last stages of human life.
105. KAROL WOJT'LA, THE ACTING PERSON (Andrzej Potocki trans., rev.
ed. 1979). There is a wide range of helpful secondary literature on Wojtyla's
philosophy of the human person. See GEORGE WEIGEL, WITNESS TO HOPE: THE
BIOGRAPHY OF POPE JOHN PAUL 11 (1999) (situating Wojtyla's philosophy of the
human person within the story of Wojtyla's life); Rocco BuT-riGLIONE, KAROL
WoJTr: THE THOUGHT OF THE MAN WHO BECAME POPE JOHN PAUL II (Paolo
Guietti & Francesca Murphy trans., 1997) (discussing Wojtyla's intellectual formation and philosophical concerns and a helpful exposition of The Acting Person); PETER SIMPSON, ON KAROL WoJTYLA (2001) (presenting an overview of
Wojtyla's philosophy); KENNETH L. SCHMITZ, AT THE CENTER OF THE HUMAN
DRAMA 121-46 (1993) (giving a concise summary of Wojtyla's philosophy that
situates his thought in the history of western philosophy); SAMUEL GREGG, CHALLENGING THE MODERN WORLD: KAROL WOJTYLA/JOHN PAUL II AND THE DEVELOPMENT

OF
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(1999)
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ing the personal structures of human action. Along the way, he
examines human desires, emotions, thoughts, decisions, and
relationships, showing in each case how concrete human activities are personal.
In the moral grammar ofJohn Paul II, a person is an individual substance of a rational nature; as such, a human person is an
embodied subject who is also a substance. Each human person is
endowed with the capacity to use reason in order to understand
the world and to direct his actions in light of his understanding
of what is good and true, but personhood is not limited to reflexive consciousness. In human beings, our rational nature is what
disposes us to consciousness and self-consciousness, but this consciousness is embodied; our personality subsists in our humanity.
Pope John Paul II has sometimes been charged with
rejecting modernity. As the pre-pontifical writings of Wojtyla
reveal, however, he did not advocate abandoning the modern
turn to the subject and returning to the Aristotelian-Thomistic
philosophy of substance. Rather, Wojtyla celebrated and used
the modem, first-person approach to consciousness and selfreflexivity because it helped to uncover important insights into
what it means to be a person. In particular, first-person selfreflection allows a special insight into the importance of personal
freedom in the human journey toward self-realization. "[I]t is
not enough to define a man as an individual of the species"
because "there is something more to him, a particular richness
and perfection in the manner of his being," which "cannot be
wholly contained within the concept 'individual member of the
species."'" 6 Each human being is a personal subject, unique
and unrepeatable.' ° "This heightened sense of the dignity of
the human person and of his or her uniqueness, and of the
connection between the pre-pontifical writings of Wojtyla and the social encyclicals of John Paul II); GREGORY R. BEABOUT ET AL., BEYOND SELF-INTEREST: A
PERSONALIST APPROACH TO HUMAN ACTION 75-98 (2002) (describing Wojtyla's
personalism, especially his account of the person and human action in relation
to Catholic social thought); JAROsLAw KuPczAK, O.P., DESTINED FOR LIBERTY.
THE HUMAN PERSON IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF KAROL WOJTYLA/JOHN PAUL II
(2000) (analyzing the relation between personhood and freedom).
106. KAROL WoJTYLA, LovE AND RESPONSIBILITY 22 (H.T. Willets trans.,
Ignatius Press 1993) (1960).
107. For a helpful account of Wojtyla's emphasis on the unrepeatable
and irreducible character of each person's life, see JOHN F. CROSBY, THE SELFHOOD OF THE HUMAN PERSON (1996) and JOHN F. CROSBY, PERSONALIST PAPERS
(2004). For a helpful account of John Paul II's account of the person as it
relates to the theme of human dignity, see Kenneth L. Grasso, Saving Modernity
from Itself John Paul H on Human Dignity, "the Whole Truth About Man," and the
Modern Quest for Freedom, in IN DEFENSE OF HUMAN DIGNITY 207 (Robert P.
Kraynak & Glenn Tinder eds., 2003).
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respect due to the journey of conscience, certainly represents
one of the positive achievements of modern culture."' ' Human
personhood is realized most fully in the personal exercise of
human freedom.
C.

Human Freedom

What is human freedom, according to John Paul II? To
make explicit the distinctive way that John Paul II understands
human freedom, we turn again to Locke and his notion of freedom. Then, we contrast it with the wayJohn Paul II understands
human freedom.
Locke, having completely separated personhood from the
human body, is left with a series of puzzles about personal freedom.' 0 9 How can an immaterial substance act? Does it have
power over matter? What does it mean to say that persons are
free? To think through these puzzles, Locke contrasts a human
person with a mundane physical object:
A tennis ball, whether in motion by the stroke of a racket,
or lying still at rest, is not by anyone taken to be a free agent.
If we inquire into the reason, we shall find it is, because we
conceive not a tennis ball to think, and consequently not
to have any volition, or preference of motion to rest, or vice
versa; and therefore has not liberty, is not a free
agent .... "0
On this Lockean view, freedom is tied up with unimpeded
thought. While a tennis ball may be free to fall until its motion is
redirected by the stroke of a racket, a person's freedom involves
the power to think one's own thoughts in a manner that is unrestrained and unimpeded.
With regard to government authorities, Locke holds that
personal freedom consists in being subject only to those laws to
which one consents."' The purpose of government, for Locke,
is to protect personal freedom, where freedom is understood as
unrestraint.
Thus, in the individualistic grammar of Locke, each person
is a disembodied, unencumbered self with the right to think his
own thoughts and live his own life without interference from
authorities, so long as he does not interfere with the rights, person, or freedom of others."l 2 A person is free to the extent that
109.
110.
111.

supra note 31, at para. 31.
See supra text accompanying notes 86-91.
LocKE, supra note 90, at 96 (emphases added); see also id. at 93-114.
See generally id.

112.

See id.

108.

VERITATIS SPLENDOR,
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he can do whatever he wants. Politically, freedom means being
subject solely to those laws to which one consents.
Like John Locke, Pope John Paul II was a great defender of
freedom, but the Pope's understanding of human freedom differs greatly from that of Locke. Part of the difference between
John Locke and John Paul II on freedom may be a function of
their different historical contexts. Locke, writing in seventeenth
century England, wanted to provide a language whereby a modern society could avoid Cromwellian tyrants. To do so, he developed the language of rights with his distinctive understanding of
the person and his modern emphasis on individual freedom
from tyrants. In contrast, John Paul II inherited the language of
rights as a deep part of the modern world. Further, having lived
through the dark night of modernity, including both the Nazi
invasion of Poland and Soviet rule, John Paul I shared Locke's
concern with being free from tyrants, but he also raised questions
beyond what we should be "free from." There is no question, for
John Paul II, about the desirability of being free from tyrannical
governments. However, more pressing questions for Pope John
Paul II were: "How do we become free persons?" and "What is
freedom for?"
In his pre-pontifical writings, Karol Wojtyla's account of freedom begins with an emphasis on self-determination. Emphasizing the development of personhood, his aim is to help people act
with personal self-determination. The freedom of self-determination is most obvious when one makes a choice to restrain oneself from acting on a desire. For example, one may have a desire
for food and then make a self-determined choice to abstain from
it. Perhaps one is on a special diet or a religious fast, or perhaps
one holds a moral conviction that it is improper to eat certain
kinds of food. In each of these cases, in order to carry out one's
freedom, what is required is a special kind of determination and
self-discipline.
In emphasizing freedom in this kind of self-restraint, Wojtyla
retrieved a notion of "ordered liberty." On this view, authentic
freedom is not only a state, but it is also ajourney and a destination. Freedom is something one grows into when, through the
responsible exercise of self-determination, one becomes a more
excellent human person. This way of understanding freedom
recognizes that there is an objective moral order, discoverable in
part by each person. Freedom involves making self-determined
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choices in accord with the moral order or in accord with goodness and truth. 1
This grammar of ordered liberty is not entirely alien to
American life. It is eloquently expressed, both in the Declaration
of Independence's emphasis on self-governance in accord with
the laws of nature and in Lincoln's Gettysburg Address: "This
nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom."' 1 4 Likewise, the notion of ordered liberty is present in the verse from
Katharine Lee Bates's America the Beautiful, "Confirm thy soul, in
self-control, Thy liberty in law."" 5
Pope John Paul II recognized the deep similarity between
his own understanding of authentic human freedom (developed
in detail in his pre-pontifical writings on the free human person
and expressed in countless speeches and writings) and the tradition of ordered liberty in the United States. On the occasion of
receiving the Honorable Lindy Boggs as Ambassador to the Holy
See, Pope John Paul II said:
The Founding Fathers of the United States asserted their
claim to freedom and independence on the basis of certain
"self-evident" truths about the human person: truths which
could be discerned in human nature, built into it by
"nature's God." Thus they meant to bring into being, not
just an independent territory, but a great experiment in
what George Washington called "ordered liberty": an
experiment in which men and women would enjoy equality
of rights and opportunities in the pursuit of happiness and
in service to the common good. Reading the founding
documents of the United States, one has to be impressed
by the concept of freedom they enshrine: a freedom
designed to enable people to fulfill their duties and
responsibilities toward the family and toward the common
good of the community. Their authors clearly understood
that there could be no true freedom without moral responsibility and accountability ....116
113. For example, the choice to use an addictive substance may be free in
the sense that it is not coerced, but repeated use of the substance is not good
because it inhibits freedom; eventually, one may become enslaved to the substance. In contrast, the choice to maintain a disciplined diet may seem to
restrict one's freedom to eat certain bad foods; but over time, this kind of selfdetermined restraint makes one's life better and healthier, thereby expanding
personal freedom.
114. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
115. KATHARINE LEE BATES, America the Beautiful (1893).
116. Pope John Paul II, Statement on the American Experiment (Dec. 16,

1997), in 82
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In the moral grammar of Pope John Paul II, human freedom means ordered liberty. It involves responsibly using one's
personal self-determination to act in accord with the objective
moral order. The relationship between human freedom and the
objective moral order "is most deeply lived out in the 'heart' of
the person," that is, in one's conscience.1 17 His or her social
environment influences each human person, but we are not
mere products of our environment. Human persons can develop
the ability through reflection to gain a critical distance whereby
we can glimpse an order that transcends us. Humans encounter
this objective moral order most fully, not as an external imposition, but personally through one's heart, i.e., in one's conscience.
For that reason, John Paul II emphasizes the importance of
"respect for conscience on its journey toward the truth.""'
Of course, conscience may be in error. For that reason,
each person has a responsibility to reflect, to listen and learn
from critics; it is sometimes easier for others to see something
that we ourselves may be unable to see without help. "There are
faults which we fail to see but which nevertheless remain
faults ..

."119 As such, "freedom of conscience is never freedom

'from' the truth but always and only freedom 'in' the truth." 2 °
Authentic freedom, then, means freedom to make responsible
choices in accord with the objective moral order as revealed by a
conscience formed to an understanding of what is good and true
in participation with others.
V.

JOHN PAUL II ON THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG STATE,
ECONOMY, AND CULTURE IN CENTESIMUS ANNUS

Understanding John Paul II's distinctive moral vocabulary
(one which, as we have suggested, is illuminated by the principle
of subsidiarity and characterized by a post-Lockean grammar of
rights, personhood, and freedom) is crucial to understanding his
teaching on the relationship between the moral law and the civil
law. He lays out the "doctrine on the necessary conformity of civil
law with the moral law" in Evangelium Vitae, in a passage that some
have interpreted as supporting the widespread implementation
of Catholic moral teaching through the political system.' 2 1 John
Paul II's teaching in Evangelium Vitae cannot be properly understood, however, without an understanding of the theory of
117.
118.
119.
120.

121.

VERITATIS SPLENDOR, supra note 31, at para. 54.
Id. at para. 31.
Id. at para. 63.
Id. at para. 64.
EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 7, at para. 72; see also supra Part I.
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church, state, and society that underlies it. John Paul II most
fully develops that theory in Chapters IV and V of John Paul II's
1991 encyclical Centesimus Annus.
Centesimus Annus is John Paul II's magnum opus in the sense
that it marks his most significant contribution to the social teaching of the Church. Centesimus Annus's release marked the one
hundredth anniversary of Leo XIII's 1891 encyclical Rerum
Novarum, which responded to the social conditions of the industrial revolution and is the founding document in the Church's
contemporary social teaching.' 2 2 One hundred years later, John
Paul II attempted to address the emerging social conditions of
the late twentieth century, particularly the collapse of communism, the increasing value of human resources, and the
marginalization of many human beings from the contemporary
economy. He also addresses the excesses and weaknesses to
which free societies are prone. Centesimus Annus diagnoses these
problems as abuses of human rights and human freedom,
employing those terms in the distinctive ways laid out above.
A.

Private Property and the FreeEconomy

In Chapter IV of Centesimus Annus, the Pope addresses private property and the free economy. He affirms the Church's
longstanding teaching on the right to private property and
reminds readers that, like all human rights, the right to private
property must be exercised in a manner consistent with human
personhood and human freedom.' 2 3 In the Pope's words, the
right to private ownership carries with it an obligation to recognize "the universal destination of the earth's goods" which are "God's
first gift[s] for the sustenance of human life."' 2 4 Expanding on
the right to private property, John Paul II expresses appreciation
for the modern
business economy and its basis of human
25
freedom.'

B.

Abuses of Economic Freedom

Consistent with his overall understanding of freedom, however, the Pope notes that economic activity, "like every other sector [of human activity], includes the right to freedom, as well as
the duty of making responsible use of freedom."1' 26 He spends
much of Chapter IV diagnosing the consequences of the abuse of
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See generally RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 70.
See, e.g., CENrEsiMus ANNUS, supra note 72, at para. 30.

Id. at para. 31 (emphasis added).
See id. at para. 32.
Id.
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human freedom in the economic sphere, including: marginalization of populations and entire nations from the contemporary
economy, 127 a culture of consumerism, 128 neglect of the natural
environment, 129 and deterioration of institutions fundamental to
an authentic human ecology, most notably the family.' 3 °
Although the Pope comments on positive and negative
aspects of contemporary economic life, he specifically denies that
the Church's social teaching provides "models" for resolving the
Instead, the Church's
actual and potential evils that he notes.'
social teaching "recognizes the positive value of the market and
of enterprise, but... at the same time points out that these need
to be oriented toward the common good.' 2 As such, the Pope's
reflection on economic freedom in Chapter IV is primarily concerned with instructing readers in an understanding of economic
"freedom" that is properly oriented toward the truth of human
personhood and human rights.
C. The Rise of Democracy and Fall of Totalitarianism
In Chapter V, John Paul II turns to examining the relationship of the state to the economic sphere and to culture, again
emphasizing that each of these spheres exists for the purpose of
preserving human rights and allowing the proper exercise of
human freedom. John Paul II begins by expressing the Church's
support for an "organization of society" that "reflects a realistic
vision of man's social nature, which calls for legislation capable
of protecting the freedom of all." ' Such an organization would
be ordered such that "each power [is] balanced by other powers
and by other spheres of responsibility which keep it within
proper bounds."' 3 4
The Pope points out the contrast between such a society and
the alternative raised by totalitarianism. Fundamental among
the errors made by totalitarian systems, according to John Paul
II, is "a denial of truth in the objective sense":
If there is no transcendent truth, in obedience to which
man achieves his full identity, then there is no sure principle for guaranteeing just relations between people ....

If

one does not acknowledge transcendent truth, then the
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See CENTESimtuS ANNUS, supra note 72, at para. 33.
See id. at para. 36.
See id. at para. 37.
See id. at paras. 38-39.
See id. at para. 43.
Id.
Id. at para. 44.
Id.
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force of power takes over, and each person tends to make
full use of the means at his disposal in order to impose his
own interests or his own opinion, with no regard for the
rights of others.' 3 5
Thus, without a commitment to transcendent truth, totalitarian
regimes cannot preserve human freedom, human personhood,
and human rights.
D.

Democracy Oriented Toward the Truth of Human Personhood

Particularly in light of these fundamental errors in totalitarian systems, the Church "values the democratic system" because
it guarantees to citizens participation in the political process and
the chance to hold leaders accountable. 13 6 However, the Pope
notes that even democracy is at risk unless it is established "on
the basis of a correct conception of the human person. '"137
John Paul II anticipates the objection that claims to absolute
truth are inconsistent with democracy, which somehow requires
the belief that "truth is determined by the majority, or that it is
13 s
subject to variation according to different political trends."
He responds that, without "ultimate truth," democracy risks falling victim to the same evils that mark totalitarianism: "[I]f there
is no ultimate truth to guide and direct political activity, then
ideas and convictions can easily be manipulated for reasons of
13 9
power.
The Pope further anticipates the charge that claims to truth
amount to "fanaticism or fundamentalism" and that those who
claim to know the truth really "claim the right to impose on
others their own concept of what is true and good."' 4 ° He distinguishes "Christian truth" from such ideologies by emphasizing
that "Christian faith does not presume to imprison changing
sociopolitical realities in a rigid schema" and by highlighting that
"the Church's method is always that of respect for freedom."''
Of course, the Pope couches the Church's support for "freedom," as always, in the affirmation of the "transcendent dignity
of the person," which is a sharp contrast from understandings of
"freedom" that rely on personal license or radical autonomy.1 4 2
The Pope again emphasizes that "freedom attains its full develop135. CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 72, at para. 44.
136. Id. at para. 46.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.

142.

Id.
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ment only by accepting the truth. In a world without truth, freedom loses its foundation and man is exposed to the violence of
passion and to manipulation, both open and hidden."'4 3
Given the Church's affirmation of the potential of the democratic system, the Pope notes with encouragement the rise, in the
wake of communism, of "the democratic ideal, together with
lively attention to and concern for human rights."1'44 In keeping
with his concerns about democracy without an orientation
toward truth, he urges forming and reforming democracies to
"give democracy an authentic and solid foundation through the
explicit recognition of those rights."14' 5 However, he disclaims a
role for the Church in "express [ing] preferences" among specific
political solutions, affirming "the legitimate autonomy of the democratic order." 4' 6 Instead, he claims that the Church's contribution
"1147
to political life is "her vision of the dignity of the person ....
E.

Role of the State in the Economic Sector

The state's role in protecting the rights and dignity of
human persons extends into the economic sector, according to
John Paul II. Although the economic sector is founded on the
basis of free economic activity, such activity "presupposes sure
guarantees of individual freedom and private property, as well as
a stable currency and efficient public services. Hence the principal task of the State is to guarantee this security .... 148
Moreover, John Paul II holds the state responsible for some
oversight of the "exercise of human rights in the economic sector," though he reserves primary responsibility for safeguarding
human rights "to individuals and to the various groups and
associations which make up society. ' Although itisnot within
the state's competence to guarantee the rights to work and to
conduct economic activity to all members of society, it has a duty
to support the exercise of economic freedom by "creating conditions which will ensure job opportunities, by stimulating [ecothey are lacking or by supporting them in
nomic] activities where
150
moments of crisis."
143.
144.

CENTESIMuS ANNUS, supra note 72, at para. 46.
Id. at para. 47.

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at para. 48.
Id.
Id.
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F.

Role of the State in Non-Economic Communities

John Paul II notes that the state's responsibility even extends
to emergency "supplementary interventions" into economic
activity under exceptional circumstances.1 5 ' However, he warns
that it is an excess of such interventions that has produced "the
so-called 'Welfare State,' "152 whereby the state develops a habit
of inappropriately "intervening directly and depriving society of
its responsibility."1 5' 3 Such interventions by the state are frequently "dominated more by bureaucratic ways of thinking than
by concern .... ,15' These subvert the roles of subsidiary organizations, violating the principle
of subsidiarity 155 and leading to "a
15 6
energies.'
human
of
loss
Consistent with the principle of subsidiarity, smaller and
more personal institutions have a primary role to play in meeting
the needs of society; these include the Church, the family, and
other communities.1 57 The preservation and invigoration of
such communities requires "a concrete commitment to solidarity and
158
charity," according to John Paul II, beginning in the family.
Each of these communities "exercise [s] primary functions and
give[s] life to specific networks of solidarity."' 5 9 Moreover, they
"personalize[ ]" society and keep people mindful "that life in
society has neither the market nor the [s] tate as its final purpose,
since life itself has a unique value which the [s] tate and the market must serve."1 6 ° The value of these communities is such that
the state must refrain from interfering with their functions, and
instead, should play a "subsidiary," or supporting role, enabling
them to serve the needs of human persons.
G.

Culture

The complementary institutions he has just discussed allow
human beings to create what John Paul II refers to as "the culture
of a nation" by supporting human freedom to seek the truth.1 6'
According to John Paul II, culture is an extension of the human
person's exercise of self-determining freedom:
151.

CENTESiMUS ANNUS,

supra note 72, at para. 48.

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
See supra Part III.
156. CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 72, at para. 48.
157. See id. at para. 49.
155.

158.

Id. (emphasis added).

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at para. 50.
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All human activity takes place within a culture and interacts with culture. For an adequate formation of a culture,
the involvement of the whole man is required, whereby he
exercises his creativity, intelligence, and knowledge of the
world and of people. Furthermore, he displays his capacity
for self-control, personal sacrifice, solidarity and readiness
to promote the common good. Thus the first and most
16 2
important task is accomplished within man's heart.
According to John Paul II, it is at this level-the level of the
human heart-that the Church makes a "specific and decisive contribution to true culture ... by preaching the truth about the creation of
the world ...and ... about the Redemption." '6 3 That truth speaks
of "an active commitment to our neighbor and demands of us a
shared responsibility for all of humanity."1 64 This duty extends
beyond our family and neighbors, particularly in a world made
increasingly small by improved communications, to a shared
responsibility for avoiding or resolving conditions that encourage
war. 165 It also extends to "promoting development" on a worldwide basis, in order to preserve peace and provide "realistic
opportunities" to the poor.16 6 Finally, it extends to a shared
responsibility as stewards of our "environmental and human
1 67
resources."
Centesimus Annus provides John Paul II's account of a society
designed to serve the dignity of human persons by allowing them
the freedom necessary to seek truth. That society is governed by
a state supportive (and never subversive) of myriad smaller communities that encourage the human person's development in
authentic freedom. Central among those communities are the
economic community, the Church, and the family, each of which
plays a distinct role in enhancing the dignity of the human person by enhancing freedom. In support of these institutions, the
state plays only a "subsidiary"-or supportive-role, with the primary purpose of preserving the conditions that allow the exercise
of freedom in these various communities.

162.
163.

CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note

164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
See id.
Id. at para. 52.
See id.

Id. (emphasis added).

72, at para. 51.
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VI.

Is

EVANGELIUM VITAE's "DOCTRINE ON THE NECESSARY

CONFORMITY OF CIVIL LAW WITH THE MORAL LAw"
AN ANTI-DEMOCRATIC CALL FOR GOVERNMENT
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CATHOLIC FAITH?

As we indicated in our introduction, some American critics
have seen in John Paul II's encyclical Evangelium Vitae an antidemocratic effort to impose Catholicism through the power of
government. We have argued that, on the contrary, Evangelium
Vitae does not admit of such an interpretation when read against
the backdrop of the theory of church, state, and society thatJohn
Paul II developed in Centesimus Annus. According to that theory,
the state's task is to play a subsidiary role, helping to order society by protecting basic human rights, while providing freedom
for the economic and cultural spheres and the various groups
that make up society. The claim in Evangelium Vitae that "laws
which legitimize the direct killing of innocent human beings
through abortion or euthanasia are in complete opposition to
the inviolable right to life proper to every individual"1 68 is a specific application of the theory of state and culture set forth more
generally in Centesimus Annus.
Why does John Paul II claim that laws that legitimize abortion or euthanasia are contrary to fundamental human rights?
His answer is not only that such laws deny the fundamental right
to life, but also, that such policies "deny the equality of everyone
before the law." '6 9 Although Evangelium Vitae does not contain a
theory of the state or an account of the need for "equality before
the law," as we have shown, those topics are treated in Centesimus
Annus. There, the Pope outlines the tasks of the state: to govern
according to the "rule of law," providing "legislation capable of
protecting the freedom of all."' 7 ° The task of the state is to play
a subsidiary role in society, helping to order social life in a manner that promotes human freedom by protecting basic human
rights. Of course, the most basic human right is the right to life.
"Consequently, a civil law authorizing abortion or euthanasia
ceases by that very fact to be a true, morally binding civil law."''
Policies permitting abortion or euthanasia lack moral force
because they are instances of the state disregarding its subsidiary
168. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 7, at para. 72.
169. Id. Some might object that we have presumed, along with John Paul
II, that the human fetus is a person. We touch on this question indirectly in
Part IV.B. For a more detailed and direct treatment of this question, see JOHN
F. KAVANAUGH, S.J., WHO COUNT AS PERSONS?
OF KILLING 125-37 (2001).

HUMAN IDENTITY AND THE ETHICS

supra note 72, at para. 44.
7, at para. 72.

170.

CENTESIMUS ANNUS,

171.

EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note
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role in helping to promote a free society through the protection
of basic human rights.
Someone might object that the teaching of Evangelium Vitae
is inconsistent with Centesimus Annus because the 1995 doctrine
on the necessary conformity of civil law with the moral law seems
to call for an active state that aggressively interferes with individual freedom, while the 1991 criticisms of the welfare state seem
to endorse a passive state that abstains from government interventions. This objection is misguided in several ways. First, "conformity of civil law with the moral law" does not mean that the
state should seek to impose policy that mirrors every feature of
the moral law. Nowhere does John Paul II teach that government policy should enforce every moral virtue. Rather, "conformity of civil law with the moral law" means that the state
should carry out its task of protecting human freedom and basic
human rights while governing according to the rule of law. Second, although John Paul II in Centesimus Annus criticizes the
bureaucratic inefficiency and impersonalism of the "Welfare
State" while calling for the use of responsible freedom in a market economy and a robust, creative, free cultural sphere, he did
not advocate a laissez-faire state. Rather, in both Evangelium Vitae
and Centesimus Annus, the teaching of John Paul II is consistent
with the view that the state should play a subsidiary role in society, seeking merely to guarantee all persons and groups the freedom to exercise their own initiative and self-determination, or to
exercise their freedom in the pursuit of truth.
Finally, someone might object that, in a pluralistic society,
Catholic leaders should not seek to impose their beliefs on
others, nor should they encourage their flock to impose Catholic
beliefs on others. John Paul II was one of the foremost defenders
of religious freedom. He spoke out in defense of the rights of
both Christians and non-Christians, including, quite prominently, his outspoken defense of Buddhist monks in Tibet and
Islamic citizens in Kosovo. Regarding the Catholic faith, he
emphasized that Christianity is an invitation to a personal journey with a loving God and also that it is a violation of the dignity
of the human person to impose religious practice through government coercion. So, it would be misguided to see his statements about abortion and euthanasia as an effort to impose his
religious beliefs on others.
The impression that John Paul II seeks to impose "Catholic
belief" through political means rests on an ambiguity in the
phrase, "Catholic beliefs." On the one hand, Catholic beliefs
include aspects of the faith available through the gift of grace,
especially one's personal relation with the Divine. John Paul II's
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emphasis on religious freedom reflects his sensitivity to the rights
of everyone to access religious truths without interference from
the state.
However, there is another sense of the phrase, "Catholic
beliefs." Catholic teaching includes confidence in reason's ability to discern basic norms needed to order social life, norms that
transcend the self-interest of the powerful. Further, Catholicism
includes the belief that the state should carry out its task of governing according to the rule of law, applying the law equally to
protect human freedom and basic human rights for all citizens.
These Catholic "beliefs," which are central to the issue at hand,
are not based on the gift of grace and the virtue of faith, but are
accessible through reason. Nor are they distinctively religious in
character, but instead, they have implications for how to form a
just society.
Critics who, in the name of "religious pluralism," would
object to the Pope and other Catholics supporting policies that
defend the basic human rights of the weak are, in fact, committed to a relativism that undermines democratic government and
the rule of law. Hiding behind the masks of tolerance and pluralism, such critics tacitly endorse a society in which only those
with the power to assert their rights-claims over others receive
the security of state protection.
In conclusion, the doctrine of the "necessary conformity of
the civil law with the moral law" is not an anti-democratic call for
the civil enforcement of Catholicism. Rather, it is a call for the
state to carry out its task of protecting human freedom and basic
human rights while governing according to the rule of law, treating each human person equally. Because laws authorizing abortion or euthanasia do not fulfill this central purpose, John Paul II
drew the conclusion that any such policy imposed by a government "ceases
by that very fact to be a true, morally binding civil
2
law."
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EVANGELIUM VrrAE, supra note 7, at para. 72.

